

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

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O 120820Z DEC 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0744

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0494

EXDIS

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DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS DEFENSE

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: MESSAGE #2: WHAT OPTION 3 SHOULD BE USED FOR

REF: A) MBFR VIENNA 0213; B) MBFR VIENNA 0214

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE PREVIOUS MESSAGE OF THIS SERIES (MBFR VIENNA 492) PRESENTED THE DELEGATION'S RECOMMENDATION THAT A WASHINGTON DECISION BE MADE TO RAISE OPTION 3 WITH THE EAST IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THIS MESSAGE ADDRESSES THE QUESTION OF WHAT ALLIED MBFR NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES IN OPTION 3 SHOULD BE USED FOR, THAT IS, HOW OPTION 3 SHOULD BE INTRODUCED INTO THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS VIS-A-VIS THE EAST. END SUMMARY.

2. THE DELEGATION BELIEVES THAT THERE IS A REASONABLE CHANCE OF OBTAINING SOVIET AGREEMENT TO SUBSTANTIAL ASYMMETRICAL WITHDRAWALS OF SOVIET GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AND TANKS THROUGH USE OF OPTION 3. HOWEVER, IT HAS BEEN OUR CONTINUING ASSESSMENT THAT OPTION 3 IS PROBABLY NOT SUFFICIENT TO GAIN SOVIET AGREEMENT BOTH TO ASYMMETRICAL GROUND FORCE WITHDRAWALS AND TO THE COMMON CEILING CON-
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CEPT. EASTERN AGREEMENT TO THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT

WOULD AMOUNT TO AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE THAT IN PHASE II THE PACT WOULD REDUCE ABOUT 10,000 MEN MORE THAN NATO, ABOVE AND BEYOND PHASE I SOVIET WITHDRAWALS.

3. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE WEST SHOULD ABANDON THE COMMON CEILING GOAL. FIRST, OUR ASSESSMENT IS ONLY TENTATIVE AND HAS NOT BEEN TESTED IN ACTUAL NEGOTIATION. IT WOULD BE PREMATURE TO MAKE A DECISION ON THE BASIS OF IT. SECOND, THE COMMON CEILING GOAL IS INTRINSICALLY IMPORTANT FOR THE US AND OUR NATO ALLIES HAVE AN INTENSE INTEREST IN IT.

4. FURTHERMORE, THE WEST MAY HAVE A REASONABLE CHANCE OF OBTAINING EASTERN AGREEMENT TO PARITY IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE COURSE OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. IN ADDITION TO OPTION 3, WHICH IS BY FAR OUR MOST IMPORTANT SOURCE OF LEVERAGE, THE FOLLOWING POTENTIAL LEVERAGE MIGHT BE CONSIDERED IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR USE EITHER TOWARD ASYMMETRICAL SOVIET PHASE I REDUCTIONS OR TOWARD ACHIEVING EASTERN AGREEMENT TO THE COMMON CEILING:

A. REDUCTIONS OF AIR MANPOWER, BOTH US AND ALLIED.

B. LIMITED PARTICIPATION BY OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, POSSIBLY INCLUDING THE FRG, IN PHASE I. REDUCTION AND CONTROL OF THE BUNDESWEHR REMAINS A LEADING EASTERN OBJECTIVE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

C. COMMITMENT AS TO THE AMOUNT OF BUNDESWEHR REDUCTIONS.

D. THE POSSIBILITY OF ADDITIONAL US NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS. WASHINGTON HAS DECIDED TO REDUCE THE CONTENT OF OPTION III FROM 54 F-4'S TO 48 F-4'S AND FROM 36 PERSHING TO 27 PERSHING. WE COULD CONSIDER USING THESE REMAINING DELIVERY SYSTEMS, PLUS ADDITIONAL WARHEADS IF THE NEGOTIATIONS REQUIRE IT.

E. SOME LIMITED MODIFICATION OF THE PRESENT WESTERN POSITION AGAINST ANY LIMITATION ON THE RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL

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NATO DIRECT PARTICIPANT COUNTRIES TO INCREASE THEIR MILITARY MANPOWER UNDER A COLLECTIVE NATO CEILING.

F. POSSIBLE DIMINUTION OF THE 150-160,000 MAN GAP BETWEEN WARSAW PACT AND ALLIED FORCES IF THIS IS JUSTIFIED BY OBJECTIVE EVIDENCE IN THE COURSE OF DATA EXCHANGE WITH THE EAST.

G. THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER REVISIONS IN THE
DEFINITION OF FORCE CATEGORIES.

H. THE OFFER TO MAKE ADDITIONAL US REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II.

I. AGREEING TO PUT SOME UPPER LIMIT ON THE SIZE OF
SOVIET REDUCTIONS EXPECTED IN PHASE II, SAY 15 PERCENT
OF SOVIET FORCES REMAINING IN THE REDUCTION AREA
AFTER PHASE I REDUCTIONS HAVE BEEN CARRIED OUT.

5. OUR CONCLUSION FROM THIS IS THAT EASTERN AGREEMENT TO THE COMMON
CEILING SHOULD CONTINUE IN ITS PRESENT STATUS AS ONE OF
THE TWO MAIN ALLIED OBJECTIVES FOR PHASE I UNTIL WE
HAVE SEEN HOW FAR OPTION 3 CARRIES US AND HOW MUCH OF THE ADDITIONAL
POTENTIAL LEVERAGE LISTED ABOVE, TO THE EXTENT APPROVED, HAS TO
BE USED TO GAIN SUBSTANTIAL ASYMMETRICAL SOVIET WITHDRAWALS.
MOREOVER, IT WOULD BE POOR NEGOTIATING TACTICS TO REDUCE OUR
OBJECTIVES AT THE SAME TIME AS WE ARE ADDING SIGNIFICANTLY TO OUR
BARGAINING LEVERAGE.

6. HOWEVER, IT SEEMS DOUBTFUL WHETHER THE ALLIES'
ORIGINAL INTENTION TO NEGOTIATE IN PHASE I ONLY ON
THE CONCEPT OF THE COMMON CEILING AND NOT ALSO ON ITS SPECIFICS
WILL PROVE FEASIBLE IN PRACTICE. INSTEAD, SERIOUS
NEGOTIATION WITH THE EAST ON THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT
WOULD PROBABLY AMOUNT TO A ONE-PHASE MBFR NEGOTIATION
WITH TWO-PHASE IMPLEMENTATION. THIS IS BECAUSE,
TO GET THE SOVIETS SERIOUSLY INVOLVED IN DISCUSSION OF
THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT, IT PROBABLY WOULD

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0494

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FROM US REP MBFR

BE NECESSARY FOR THE WEST TO INDICATE WILLINGNESS TO TAKE A NUMBER OF THE STEPS LISTED IN PARAGRAPH 4 ABOVE. MOREOVER, IF THE SOVIETS DO SHOW WILLINGNESS TO GET ENGAGED IN SERIOUS NEGOTIATION ABOUT THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT, THEY WILL WISH TO HAVE CLARITY AND, PROBABLY, ACTUAL ASSURANCES, ON SUCH THINGS AS: (A) THE ACTUAL LEVEL OF THE COMMON CEILING; (B) THE SIZE OF GERMAN, US AND SOVIET FORCES TO BE REDUCED IN PHASE II; (C) INCLUSION OF FURTHER UNCLEAR IN PHASE II; (D) REDUCTION OF THE MANPOWER GAP TO MORE MANAGEABLE PROPORTIONS; AND (E) THE ISSUE OF NATIONAL CEILINGS ON THE FEDERAL GERMANS.

7. THE NET OUTCOME OF A SERIOUS EAST-WEST DISCUSSION ON THESE TOPICS WOULD PROBABLY BE A FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT COVERING WESTERN AND EASTERN REDUCTIONS FOR BOTH PHASES. ONLY A FEW QUESTIONS WOULD BE LEFT OPEN FOR RESOLUTION IN PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS, PERHAPS HOW TO COPE WITH THE EASTERN DEMAND THAT FEDERAL GERMAN AND BENELUX FORCES BE DISBANDED AND THE TIMING OF THE ENTRY INTO EFFECT OF PHASE II.

8. THIS ANALYSIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE ALLIES WOULD BE
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IRREVOCABLY COMMITTED THROUGH THEIR INTEREST IN OBTAINING EASTERN AGREEMENT TO THE COMMON CEILING TO NEGOTIATING ALL THESE ISSUES DURING PHASE I. THEY COULD DEFER THE COMMON CEILING AND ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH IT TO PHASE II BY RELAXING THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE EAST AGREE IN A PHASE I AGREEMENT TO THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT IN FAVOR OF A LESS SPECIFIC COMMITMENT ON THIS SUBJECT. THIS MIGHT TAKE THE FORM, FOR EXAMPLE, OF AN AGREED STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT THE PARTICIPANTS COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO MAKE FURTHER MOVEMENT IN THE SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS TOWARDS PARITY IN GROUND FORCES.

9. THEREFORE, THE FIRST QUESTION THE WEST WILL FACE ONCE THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS REACH A STAGE OF SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF THE COMMON CEILING IS PROBABLY NOT WHETHER OR NOT THE COMMON CEILING HAS TO BE DROPPED AS A MAJOR WESTERN OBJECTIVE, BUT THE PRACTICAL ONE OF WHAT ISSUES THE WEST WANTS TO NEGOTIATE ABOUT IN PHASE I.

THIS DECISION SHOULD NOT BE MADE UNTIL THE ALLIES CAN
SEE IN ACTUAL PRACTICE HOW FAR THEY CAN GET WITH
THE EAST BY USING OPTION 3 AND WHAT ISSUES THE EAST
ACTUALLY RAISES IN CONNECTION WITH THE COMMON CEILING.

10. WE CONCLUDE THAT THE BEST TACTICAL USE OF OPTION 3
IS TO INTRODUCE IT IN RETURN FOR BOTH THE WITHDRAWAL
OF THE TANK ARMY AND THE COMMON CEILING, AND TO
PUSH BOTH OF THESE WESTERN OBJECTIVES IN TANDEM.
THIS APPROACH ALSO MAKES SENSE IN TERMS OF US RELATIONS
WITH THE NATO ALLIES. A SUBSEQUENT MESSAGE OUTLINES AN
APPROACH TO THE ALLIES DESIGNED TO EXPEDITE THEIR
AGREEMENT TO INTRODUCTION OF USE OF OPTION 3 WITH
THE EAST.RESOR

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED DEFENSE.

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